Bibliographische Angaben
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739/1896. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Textstelle
If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea. (Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VI)
Argumentrekonstruktion
- The self exists invariably.
- If an impression gives rise to an idea of something that exists invariably, then that impression itself exists invariably. (implizit)
- If any impression gives rise to the idea of the self, that impression itself exists invariably. (Zwischenkonklusion, aus 1-2)
- Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time.
- No impression exists invariably. (Zwischenkonklusion, aus 4)
- There is no impression that gives rise to the idea of the self. (Zwischekonklusion, aus 3,5)
- Every real idea must be derived from an impression.
- We do not have a real idea of the self. (Aus 1-4)
Kommentar
Eine philosophische Diskussion des obigen Argumentes erfordert insbesondere eine Auseinandersetzung mit Humes Terminologie (z.B. „idea,“ „impression,“ „passion,“ „sensation“, „(real) idea“). So ist z.B. der Schluss von 4 auf 5 nur gültig unter der Annahme, dass es keine „Impressionen“ jenseits der in 4 genannten gibt.